Efforts could have been ramped up when President Joe Biden in April set withdrawal for the end of August. The US government needs now to commit the people and resources necessary to clear the number of SIV and refugee cases by a reasonable but ambitious target—say, 95 percent of the cases by the end of the year.
Congress should approve money for overtime and for bringing back retired homeland security, intelligence, and military personnel to clear this backlog. The United States needs to honor its debt to those Afghans who risked their lives for the United States by reviewing their claims, thoroughly and fairly, before the end of this year.
Previously he was the deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security. The complacent and haphazard withdrawal from Afghanistan impacts US interests, increases the threat against Americans, and puts our security cooperation relationships at risk. In turn, US and European national security and economic security will incur new risks beyond transregional terrorism. For NATO to invoke Article 5 for the very first time in history was not just a treaty obligation, it was also a manifestation of trust and an affirmation of the integrity of American security cooperation.
Now, nearly twenty years later, the debacle in Kabul, including the tragic recent deaths of Americans, further stress-tests the integrity of American security cooperation, but concurrently highlights the blunt necessity of staying the course on security cooperation. Well before August 16, foreign partners were already questioning the reliability of America at a time where the debate in Washington about our global posture along with security assistance and arms-transfers policies appears to be more politicized for domestic posture.
The changes over the past weeks have been dramatic. Taliban militants—who still have close ties to al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups—now control Afghanistan. The withdrawal of US and other troops has left the country without a government or political system, its population without protection, as well as an ingrained economic and humanitarian crisis.
When combined with dire socioeconomic conditions and a gaping power vacuum, the recent Kabul airport attack created conditions that are ripe for insurgency. US diplomatic efforts must also address the economic and humanitarian crises. With China, Russia, and Iran poised to build closer relationships with the Taliban, it is crucial that Washington start a new phase in its relationship with Afghanistan.
But other governments might worry that the United States could pursue actions that demoralize their armed forces—as occurred when the White House struck a deal with the Taliban without the participation of the Kabul government. But its first responsibility should be to strengthen democracy and human rights at home and to ensure that Afghan refugees are properly welcomed, so that they can become productive citizens.
To American allies in Europe, the Afghanistan debacle came as a shock following the Nord Stream 2-related decision by the Biden administration. Europeans are angry; in both cases, they were left in the dark while the consequences are owned together. The anger is justified—but beware of those who want to use this temporary short-circuit in the transatlantic relationship to push for a decoupling from America.
Yes, it is a wake-up call to Europeans that however counterintuitive, the more they build their own capabilities, the more the United States will be inclined to stick with its allies.
The one big takeaway for the Biden administration should be that the honeymoon with Europe is over. Well-crafted words, no matter how many times they are repeated, are not enough. Simply not being Trump will not convince European allies about the strategic relationship. That is where I was this last week. Even better? At the very top of that list was fixing US policy on Pakistan. It is tempting to view the heartbreaking events of the last month as failed US policy on Afghanistan.
While that is indeed the case, viewing it so narrowly implies that there was ever a chance for a successful policy in Afghanistan, without changing policy toward Pakistan, a primary regional partner in the war on terrorism for the last twenty years. To study Pakistan is to study a complex territory that is no more accurately defined as a single entity as Afghanistan.
This multi-polarity creates a country that relies on the US for significant foreign aid, while also aligning itself with China. It is a nuclear-armed, state sponsor of terror—that presents itself as the primary partner in regional security matters—and also a partner to the United States in the war on terror for two decades. Within its borders, Osama bin Laden sought and found a safe haven, with the Taliban finding what was, in effect, a cryo-chamber for that same war.
US policy towards Pakistan has not effectively addressed these serious contradictions, and Afghanistan has been blatantly obvious proof that the policy has not protected US or allied national security interests. For some of us, it was hearing about casualties on the news, but for others, it was far more personal: deploying and fighting a war that, in retrospect, was unwinnable. And though ending the war offers an opportunity to look forward for those who have put so much on the line for so little, it is perhaps more important to look back.
As revelations like those in the Pentagon Papers suggest, many in Washington, at a minimum, put an overly optimistic face on reports; others misled the public and the congressional representatives charged with their oversight. A full congressional investigation of the twenty-year war would help to uncover this, bring some accountability for these failures where possible, and set up better mechanisms to prevent such mistakes from happening again.
We cannot do any less. August 31 was a dark day for America. Hundreds of American citizens were unable to be evacuated, along with thousands of vulnerable Afghan allies. Our terrorist enemies are emboldened, and with no military presence in the country, it will be much harder to disrupt their plotting. While the situation in Afghanistan is bleak, there are three steps the administration should take to mitigate the fallout from the withdrawal. First, our top priority must be to bring every American home.
The Taliban will certainly try to use them as pawns to extract various concessions, which is why the administration must be firm: Getting Americans to safety is non-negotiable. Second, the administration must resist pressure to normalize relations with the Taliban. It is subject to sweeping terrorism sanctions at the UN and under US law. Those sanctions should stay in place, assets should remain frozen, and there should be no diplomatic recognition.
Third, the administration should support Ahmad Massoud—and, indeed, any credible anti-Taliban resistance movement. The son of the legendary Northern Alliance leader has assembled a militia in the Panjshir Valley and is vowing to resist. I joined the US Foreign Service about the same time in that Iran took American diplomats hostage, and during my year career, I saw many presidents deal with tragedy and failure in the Middle East.
That includes the truck bombing that killed US service members, mostly Marines, in Beirut. I was struck by four elements of the speech.
The same fate befell President Donald Trump, by far the U. He too declared all U. He succeeded in reducing forces to the lowest number since U. In another place and time, domestic pressure might have compelled a president to withdraw much earlier. Afghanistan never curried that kind of opposition. Presidents confronted little popular opposition to staying, however confused Americans were by the war.
Not so with leaving. A president had to worry about political blowback to an attack on the homeland. Leaving was more politically dangerous than staying. Only President Biden actually managed to end the war for America.
Something must be said for his longstanding distaste for the war. Yet we can also see how the context had changed. The shadow of Sept. In the Pentagon, fear of terrorism had been eclipsed by concern for the great power competition against China and Russia. It was no longer reasonable to assume that terrorism demanded that the United States worry about Afghanistan.
That cannot explain why we should remain. The tragedy of Afghanistan is that success was unlikely and getting out was difficult. There was no easy way out. Our war in Afghanistan is perhaps better viewed as a trial to be endured than a choice. That is not to absolve leaders from the many mistakes that were made. And while the military prides itself on leaving no one behind, McKenzie said Americans in "the very low hundreds," who had wanted to leave, couldn't get to the airport.
But I think if we stayed another ten days, we would not get everybody out that wanted to get out. It's a tough situation," McKenzie said. He said that in the five final flights that took off, no Americans made it on board. The U. It's unclear what the evacuation picture will look like now that the U. McKenzie repeated the U. Biden, who has long opposed the war in Afghanistan, stuck to his decision to withdraw troops by the end of the month as the U.
The president did not speak on Monday, instead releasing a written statement following McKenzie's remarks thanking commanders and service members for completing the withdrawal on schedule and "with no further loss of American lives" and praising the evacuation effort as "the largest airlift in US history. He said he would address the American people on Tuesday on his decision not to extend the U. He closed by listing the names of the 13 service members in last week's attack "who lost their lives last week to save tens of thousands.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in remarks Monday following a virtual meeting with allied nations on Afghanistan, announced the U. Embassy in Kabul was moved to Doha, Qatar. The military mission has ended, new diplomatic mission has begun," he said.
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